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$x5o,ooo which Weisant was required to get. But that does not prove that
he would not have written the required amount had he been left alone.
The confusion resulting from the establishment of two agencies in the same
city, apparently in competition with each other, may have been the cause
of the loss of much business by Weisant, not to mention his loss of time in
trying to have matters straightened out.
It is as effective an excuse of performance of a condition that the
promisor has hindered performance as that he has actually prevented it.
Williston on Contracts, vol. z, sec. 677. Mr. Williston has made an excep-
tion to this principle where the hindrance is due to some action of the
promisor, which, under the terms of the contract or the customs of the bus-
mess, he was permitted to take. It could well be found that this exception
does not apply to the present case, because the acts of hindrance, in them-
selves, indicated bad faith on the part of the insurance company and a breach
of the fiduciary relation, and by depriving Weisant of the benefits under
his contract, such acts amounted to a breach of contract. Meyers v. Knwzker-
bocker Ins. Co., ante.
By hindering Weisant in performing the condition precedent, the in-
surance company waived such condition. As a result, there was no valid
reason for Weisant's discharge on January 6, 1931. Interpreted in this
light, the discharge being wrongful, Weisant became entitled to damages for
breach of the contract, and these should have been set off against the in-
surance company's counterclaim.
E. R. TEPLE
THE POWER OF MUNICIPALITIES To PURCHASE PROPERTY
BY THE PLEDGE OF RECEIPTS PLAN
Plaintiff in error, a village owning a distributing system for electric
current, contracted with another to supply generating machinery for its sys-
tem for the sum of $24,96o payable partly in cash and partly in deferred
installments from the net revenues derived from the plant's operation. The
title to the machinery was to remain in the seller until paid for, but the
purchase price installments were not to be the general obligation of the
village or payable from taxes. One Hill, a taxpayer, resident of the village,
brings this action to restrain the village from carrying out the terms of the
contract, contending that the transaction is prohibited by Section 6, Article
VIII of the Constitution of Ohio. Held--"The foregoing transaction be-
tween the village and the seller of the machinery contemplates the union of
the property of the village with that of the seller in a common enterprise,
from which the net earnings of the joint operation would be paid to the
seller. To the extent that the village devoted the whole of its own property
to secure the seller, to that extent did it loan its financial credit to, and in
aid of the seller, in violation of Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution
of Ohio." Village of Brewster v. Hill, lz8 Ohio St. 343, 7 Ohio Bar No.
1z, June 18, 1934. (Decided, April II, 1934).
The constitutional provision referred to providesi-"No laws shall be
passed authorizing any county, city, town or township, by vote of its citizens
or otherwise, to become a stockholder in any joint stock company, corporation,
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or association whatever; or to raise monel for, or to loan its credit to, or in
aid of any such company, corporation, or association."
The common definition of credit is "that confidence in the ability and
intention of a purchaser or borrower to make payment at some future time,"
-Pope's Legal Definitions, A-I, Vol. I, and similarly, "trust given or re-
ceived, expectation of future payment for property transferred or of fulfill-
ment of promises given."--Webster's International Dictionary
Since the transaction in dispute involves the sale of property for a con-
sideration, part of which is to be paid in the future, the village is the
recipient of the credit that has been loaned by the seller.
The Supreme Court of Ohio in support of its opinion cited the follow-
ing cases: Taylor v. Commissioners of Ross County, 23 Ohio St., 22, 35
L. R. A., 737, (1872), Alter v. City of Cincinnati, 56 Ohio St., 47, 46
N.E., 69, (1897), Markley v Village of Mineral City, 58 Ohio St., 430,
51 N.E. z8, (1896), Campbell v. Cincinnati Street Ry. Co., 97 Ohio St.,
283, ix9 N.E., 735, (1918), and Cincinnati v Harth, ioi Ohio St., 344,
i8 N.E., 263, 13 .A.L.R., 308, (192o). There is no argument as to the
correctness of the principles of law, as applied to the facts present in each
case. A review of these cases, however, shows that each of them, by its facts,
can be clearly distinguished from the principal case.
Taylor v. Commissioners of Ross County (supra) involved the consti-
tutionality of a legislative enactment purporting to authorize subdivisions of
the state to enter upon the construction of railroad lines. It followed of
necessity, therefore, that where funds allotted for that purpose were insuffi-
cient, the construction would have to be completed by private individuals
or companies, who then would own or have beneficial control of the railroad
when completed. It is hardly debatable that the statute there in question
was unconstitutional, because it indirectly permitted subdivisions of the state
to extend their aid or credit by expressly authorizing them to undertake cer-
tain construction work, the benefit of which might later accrue to private
persons. That case, however, involved no contemplated sale of property by
a private concern to a village or other subdivision of the state, as in the
Brewster Case, and for that reason should not stand as authority for any con-
clusion which may be reached under the facts of the Brewster Case.
The case of Alter v. City of Cincinnati (supra) also involved a statutory
enactment, whereby municipalities were authorized to contract for the addi-
tion to, or extension of waterworks systems, on such a basis that the city
owning a part, and the contractor owning a part, the system would become a
common enterprise. Since this enterprise would be in the nature of a part-
nership, each party would be liable for the debts of the partnership, and thus
each party would extend its credit to the other to the extent that it contem-
plated the paying by one party of any of the other party's share of the part-
nership debts. The transaction authorized in the Alter Case as distinguished
from the principal case, contemplated a permanent enterprise in which the
property of the city was to be permanently united in a partnership with the
property of the other party Furthermore, no conditional sale was there in-
volved, and the city was never to have complete legal title to the whole
property
In Maraley v. Village of Mineral City (supra) the village purchased
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certain real estate out of its funds with the intention of conveying the prop-
erty to a certain manufacturing company as an inducement to build and
operate its plant within the municipality There it was correctly held that
the conveyance of the property to the manufacturing company was unconsti-
tutional as a violation of Section 6, Article VIII. The fallacy of setting that
case up as an authority for the conclusion of the Brewster Case, rests in this
distinction,-in the Mineral City Case the property was to be conveyed with
no return of consideration, and the private company was to receive the
benefit of municipal funds gratis, while in the principal case, the city in
purchasing the property contracted for a reasonable consideration therefor.
Not only is there this distinction, but the facts are also different, in that in
the one case the village was conveying property while in the other it was
purchasing property.
Campbell v. Cincinnatt Street Ry. Co. (supra) involved the constitu-
tionality of an ordinance of the City of Cincinnati, providing for a grant
to the street railway company of the right to operate jointly a street railway
owned by the citv with a system already owned by the company The ordi-
nance also provided that the gross proceeds of the operation of the joint
enterprise should be used for the payment of existing and hereafter issued
securities of the company The securities already existing were the individual
liability of the street railway company, and since the property of the city
was to be used in earning money to pay off these liabilities, the result would
follow that the city was lending its aid to the company in an unconstitutional
manner. But the similarity between that case and the principal case ends
with the union of the distributing system with the generating equipment,
for the proceeds in the Brewster Case were not to be used in extending credit
to the seller, but merely to acquire legal title.
The last case cited by the court as sustaining its opinion was City of
Cincinnati v. Hartk (supra) which case involved Sections 3812-2, 3813-3
of the General Code of Ohio. The court held that insofar as such provisions
purported to authorize a municipality to replace, renew, repair or reconstruct
the rails, ties, roadbed or tracks of a street railway company with public money
raised by the sale of bonds of the municipality, these provisions were uncon-
stitutional. Here again, the facts show a contemplation of extending aid to
a street railway company through the performance of services gratis. There
was to be no purchase of property for the use of the city as in the Brewster
Case, and hence the one case can hardly stand in support of the other.
Since the cases cited are not analagous, the Supreme Court might well
have followed the policy which it established in Cincinnati v. Dexter, 55
Ohto St., 93, 44t N. E., 520, (1896) and Newark v. Fromholtz, oz Ohio
St., 8I, 13o N. E., 561, (i92i) in both of which cases, a conclusion might
easily have been reached that the transactions involved were unconstitutional,
as contemplating the extension of credit. The court saw fit in those in-
stances, however, to construe Section 6, Article VIII liberally so that the
transactions not being objectionable in any way, were by reason of policy held
to be legal.
In Ciminnatt v. Dexter (supra) it was held that the Act of March 17,
1887, (84 0. L. 8z) which authorized municipalities to construct and sell
railways was not in conflict with Section 6, Article VIII. It was further held
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that no sale as authorized by that Act would become unconstitutional by
reason of the fact that the purchase price of the property was to be paid by
the purchaser from future gross earnings of the road.
Newark v. Fromholtz (supra) involved these facts; an electric railway
company being liable under the terms of its franchise for the cost of repaving
that part of a street occupied by it, made arrangements with the city for the
city to repave that part of the street, whereupon the company became respon-
sible for reimbursing the city for the sub expended in its behalf. The trans-
action was held not to constitute the extension of credit, so as to be prohibited
by Section 6, Article VIII.
It is submitted, that having in mind the facts of the principal case and
of the cases of Cirminati v Dexter (supra) and Newark v. Fromholtz
(supra), and applying the above stated definition of credit, there is actually
more of an extension of credit in these latter cases than can be found in the
principal case.
Section 4, Article XVIII of the Constitution of Ohio bestows on munici-
palities "the right to acquire, construct, own, lease and operate, within or
without its corporate limits, any public utility the product or service of which
is or is to be supplied to the municipality or its inhabitants, and may contract
with others for any such product or service."
Section I2, Article XVIII provides that "any municipality which
acquires, constructs or extends any public utility and desires to raise money
for such purposes may issue mortgage bonds therefor beyond the general
limit of bonded indebtedness prescribed by law; provided that such mortgage
bonds issued beyond the general limit of bonded indebtedness prescribed by
law shall not impose any liability on such municipality but shall be secured
only upon the property and revenues of such public utility, including a fran-
chise stating the terms upon which in case of foreclosure, the purchaser may
operate the same, which shall in no case extend for a longer period than
twenty years from the date of the sale of such utility and franchise on fore-
closure."
In adopting these provisions as a part of the Constitution, the people
of Ohio made clear their intention to bestow sweeping authority on the
municipalities in so far as public utility services are concerned. That the
decision of the Supreme Court in the principal case abridges the power of
municipalities to carry out the intention of the people may be demonstrated
by a comparison of the "pledge of receipts condition sale" plan with the
"mortgage bond" method of purchasing equipment for the extension of
utility services. Under the "mortgage bond" method, the Constitution ex-
pressiy provides: "such mortgage bonds issued beyond the general limit of
bonded indebtedness prescribed by law shall be secured only upon the prop-
erty and revenues of such utility." The effect of this constitutional pro-
vision is to grant municipalities the authority to issue bonds on the whole
utility system and not a mere part thereof. The Constitution goes even
further and states the exact course to be pursued in case the village were to
default on .the bonds: the property secured by the bonds shall include "a
franchise stating the terms upon which in case of foreclosure the purchaser
may operate the same." "The conditional sale pledge of receipts" plan
amounts to little more than a lease of the property by the seller to the pur-
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chaser until the amounts paid total the stipulated purchase price. There is
no danger of the village losing its title and right to operate the whole system
because of foreclosure as there is under the "mortgage bond" method of
financing the transaction. True, the receipts on the operation of the entire
system are pledged under that particular plan for the payments to be made
before acquiring legal title, but were the village to fail in making sufficient
payments to acquire legal title, it would still retain that part of the system
originally owned by it.
Besides these distinctions between the two methods there is another.
The "conditional sale" plan is simple in operation and effect, while the
"mortgage bond" method is cumbersome and its effect may be more disas-
trous on the municipality's rights in the system. A "conditional sale" in-
volves only the making of a contract, the recording of same, the payment of
installments when due, title automatically passing to the purchaser when the
last payment is made. To finance by means of "mortgage bonds," it is neces-
sary that a suitable market be found for them, that payments on the bonds
be made to divers persons if the seller is indisposed to purchase the bonds
or take them as security for payment. There is a possibility that under such
a method the village may have to deal with many parties, while the entire
transaction under the "conditional sale" plan involves only purchaser and
seller. Surely it was not the intention of the people to give municipalities the
authority to finance purchases by issuance of "mortgage bonds" and deprive
them of the power of purchasing the equipment by a much more desirable
method, the "conditional sale" method. That such was their intention be-
comes even more improbable upon the realization that the sole objection to
the "conditonal sale pledge of receipts" plan is based upon a conclusion
arrived at by technical reasoning, that a transaction under that plan would
constitute a lending of credit by the municipality Add to this, the fact
that under the "mortgage bond" method there is an extension of credit to a
much greater degree than possible under the "pledge of receipts" plan, and
one is led to the conclusion that the broad powers granted to municipalities
in regard to utility services includes the authority to purchase equipment
under the plan involved in the principal case.
JAMEs R. TRrrsCHLER
USE OF THE INJUNCTION To PROTECT RIGHTS
OF PERSONALITY*
The recent case of Tate v. Eidelman 32 0. N. P (N.S.) 478 (decided
in Common Pleas Court of Mahoning County September zi, i934), in which
Plaintiff sought to restrain an infringement of his civil rights,'presents again
the question of whether or not the court of equity has the power to protect
rights of personality by an injunction-an oft-recurring problem that the
courts have not adequately solved. Plaintiff sought an injunction restraining
the defendant restaurateur from refusing, solely on account of race and
color, to serve him and other citizens. Although the court intimated that it
was dissatisfied and would favor the extension of the use of the injunction,
* Published in Ohio Bar, Dec. 8, 1934.
